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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
S T A T E O F U T A H , 
Plaintiff-A ppellant, 
-vs-
J O S E P H MORGAN, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
S T A T E M E N T O F T H E N A T U R E 
O F T H E CASE 
The State of Utah, appellant, appeals the resen-
tencing of respondent, Joseph Morgan, by the Third 
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Judge, pre-
siding. 
D I S P O S I T I O N I N T H E L O W E R COURT 
Joseph Morgan was resentenced on August 3,1973, 
to the crime of simple possession of a controlled sub-
stance with a term of six months in the Salt Lake Coun-
ty Jail by the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Judge. 
I Case No. 
v 
13451 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the resentencing of 
respondent by Judge Hanson and an affirmation of the 
conviction and sentencing by Judge Sawaya for the 
crime of unlawful possession of a controlled substance 
with intent to distribute for value. 
S T A T E M E N T O F F A C T S 
This appeal is pursuant to the provisions of Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-39-4(3) which provides the state with a 
right of appeal "from an order made after judgment af-
fecting the substantial rights of the state." The respon-
dent was convicted in the Third Judicial District Court, 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah by the Honorable 
James S. Sawaya of being an aider and abettor of the 
crime of unlawful possession of a controlled substance 
with intent to distribute for value. Respondent was tried 
without a jury before Judge Sawaya. This conviction 
was entered on November 30, 1972, and on December 
12, 1972, respondent was sentenced by Judge Sawaya to 
the Utah State Prison for the indeterminate term pro-
vided by law. 
Subsequent to Mr. Morgan's trial, Mrs. Morgan 
(the perpetrator) was charged and tried for the same 
offense, possession of a controlled substance with in-
tent to distribute for value. This was a jury trial pre-
sided over by the Honorable Ernest F . Baldwin, J r . 
Mrs. Morgan was found guilty by the jury of the lesser 
offense of mere possession rather than possession with 
intent to distribute for value. 
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Following Mrs. Morgan's conviction, the respon-
dent filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the 
Third Judicial District Court which was assigned to 
Judge Stewart Hanson. The petition alleged that since 
Mrs. Morgan, the perpetrator of the crime, had been 
subsequently convicted of a lesser offense it was im-
proper for Mr. Morgan, the aider and abettor of the 
crime, to have been convicted of a greater offense. Judge 
Hanson although refusing to grant the writ of habeas 
corpus heard testimony and then on his own motion de-
cided to remand the matter to Judge Sawaya for re-
sentencing. Judge Sawaya refused to reconsider the 
matter, feeling he was correct in his original decision. 
On the same day counsel for both the state and Mr. 
Morgan returned to Judge Hanson who stated that in 
his opinion Judge Sawaya should have resentenced re-
spondent to a lesser charge and Judge Hanson proceed-
ed to resentence the defendant to a six month term in 
the Salt Lake County Jail for the lesser crime of simple 
possession of a controlled substance. On September 12, 
1973, this court upheld the original conviction of re-
spondent by Judge Sawaya on the ground that there 
was sufficient evidence to convict Mr. Morgan of pos-
session of a controlled substance with intent to dis-
tribute for value, but by that time the defendant had 
been resentenced and released by Judge Hanson. 
A R G U M E N T 
POINT I 
W H E R E T H E A I D E R A N D ABET-
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TOR O F A C R I M E W A S T R I E D , CON-
V I C T E D A N D S E N T E N C E D P R I O R 
TO T H E S E P A R A T E T R I A L O F T H E 
P R I N C I P A L O F T H E CRIME, I T W A S 
L E G A L L Y P O S S I B L E A N D P R O P E R 
F O R T H E A I D E R A N D A B E T T O R 
TO B E C O N V I C T E D O F A G R E A T E R 
O F F E N S E T H A N T H E P R I N C I P A L . 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-44 (1953) provides: 
"All persons concerned in the commission 
of a crime, either felony or misdemeanor, 
whether they directly commit the act consti-
tuting the offense or aid and abet in its com-
mission . . . are principals in any crime so 
committed.' 
Thus, in Utah there is not the traditional common law 
distinction between principals of the first degree and 
aiders and abettors or accessories before the fact, etc. 
The authorities are abundantly clear that there need 
not be an actual conviction of a principal to a crime in 
order for another person to also be found guilty of that 
same crime on the theory that he aided and abetted. I t 
is, of course, true that there must be proof that a crime 
was committed, and that there was another person in-
volved in committing that crime, but this proof can be 
made at the aider and abettor's trial by any probative, 
admissible evidence. I t is not limited to proof that some-
one else has actually been convicted of the criminal of-
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fense itself. This principle was succinctly stated in the 
case of Britto v. People, 497 P.2d 325 (Colo. 1972). I n 
that case the defendant had been convicted of vehicular 
assault although he was sitting in the back seat of the 
automobile at the time. The Colorado Supreme Court 
reversed the conviction because there had been no show-
ing of intent as the statute required, but in doing so, 
because of its particular applicability to the facts of the 
case, stated a proposition which they considered to be 
"elementary." 
"To successfully convict a defendant of be-
ing an accessory there must be sufficient evi-
dence presented to show that there was, in fact, 
a principal who was guilty of the crime 
charged. (Citation omitted.) I t is inconsequen-
tial whether or not the principal was ever 
charged with a criminal offense. (Citation 
omitted.)" 497 P.2d 326. 
In the case of State v. Spillman, 468 P.2d 376 
(Ariz. 1970), the Arizona Supreme Court considered 
a conviction for the crime of rape which was based, in 
part, on a theory of aiding and abetting another in com-
mitting a forceable rape. The Arizona statute concern-
ing aiding and abetting, A.R.S. § 13-139 is practically 
identical to our section 76-1-44. The Court held as fol-
lows: 
"What is required at the trial of the aider 
and abettor is proof, complete and convincing, 
of the guilt of the principal. Justice demands 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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that the principal crime be fully proved, since 
the guilt of the aider and abettor depends upon 
the commission of the principal crime. Thus, 
whether or not the principal is convicted or ac-
quitted in a separate trial can have no bearing 
on the trial of the aider and abettor, if the evi-
dence shows the latter gui l ty . . . . We hold that 
defendant's conviction under A.R.S. § 13-139 
not made invalid by the fact that Gilbert Felix 
was later acquitted of rape." (Emphasis add-
ed). 468 P.2d at 378. 
In State v. Slater, 476 P.2d 719 (Wash. 1970), a 
burglary conviction, which was based on aiding and 
abetting, was affirmed because properly admitted evi-
dence indicated the presence of others at the scene. 
R.C.W. 9.01.030 of the Washington Criminal Code de-
fines principal, almost identically to our Section 76-1-44, 
as including one who aids and abets. The Court held: 
"When the state relied on proof of aid-
ing and abetting to sustain their charge against 
Slater as a principal, they were required to 
prove that a crime had actually been commit-
ted, as well as the fact that Slater aided and 
abetted in its commission. Evidence which 
would be admissible against the principal if 
tried alone may be admitted in evidence on the 
trial of the aider and abettor in order to prove 
the principal crime was committed. (Citation 
omitted.) The prosecution of the third person 
is not a prerequisite to the prosecution of the 
aider and abettor." (Emphasis added). 476 
R 2 d at 721. 
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For similar holdings see Cody v. State, 361 P.2d 
307 (Okl.Cr. 1961); People v. Simpson, 152 P.2d 339 
(Calif. 1944). 
The case of State v. Pacheco, 27 Utah 2d 281, 495 
P.2d 808 (1972) is consistent with these holdings. In 
that case a grand larceny conviction was reversed be-
cause the court found that an instruction on aiding and 
abetting was prejudicial inasmuch as "no one was proven 
guilty of larcency except the defendant, and since there 
was no evidence of any aiding and abetting. . . ." {Id.) 
there was no suggestion that a separate individual must 
first be convicted of the identical crime in a separate 
proceeding but only that in the defendant's trial itself 
there be proof that a crime was committed and that 
someone else was also involved. 
A very closely analogous situation to that present-
ed here is covered by Utah Code Ann. § 77-21-40 (1953) 
which provides: 
"An accessory may be prosecuted, tried, and 
punished, though the principal may be neither 
prosecuted nor tried, though the principal may 
have been acquitted." 
As defined in Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-45 (1953), an "ac-
cessory" is meant to be an "accessory after the fact." 
As noted, "principal" includes aiders and abettors. 
Therefore, no similar statute is required for aiders 
and abettors. But clearly the policy of the State 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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is not to require the successful conviction of one criminal 
as a prerequisite to the conviction of another criminal. 
In the present case, there was ample evidence under 
the above standards to find Mr. Morgan guilty of aid-
ing and abetting in the commission of the crime of un-
lawful possession of a controlled substance with intent 
to distribute for value. This court, has, in fact, already 
ruled on this issue in that Mr. Morgan recently appealed 
his initial conviction to this court alleging there was in-
sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction. This court 
specifically held there was sufficient evidence to uphold 
his conviction and affirmed Judge Sawaya's decision. 
State v. Morgan, Utah 2d , P.2d , Case 
Number 13218 (1974). 
Thus, appellant submits that since this court has 
already held there was sufficient evidence at Mr. Mor-
gan's trial to prove that a crime had been committed 
and that both Mr. Morgan and his wife assisted one 
another in the commission of that crime. The fact that 
in a subsequent trial before a separate judge Mr. Mor-
gan's wife was convicted of only a lesser offense is im-
material. Mr. Morgan could have been so convicted even 
though his wife had never been convicted of anything 
as long as the evidence at his trial indicated his guilt. 
POINT II 
T H E R E S E N T E N C I N G COURT 
L A C K E D J U R I S D I C T I O N TO R E -
S E N T E N C E R E S P O N D E N T . 
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While respondent's appeal was still pending before 
this court, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
alleging a new ground not raised in his brief on appeal 
(that an aider and abettor of a crime cannot be con-
victed of a greater offense than that of his principal.) 
Judge Hanson refused to treat the matter as a habeas 
corpus proceeding, but heard evidence, and on his own 
motion ordered the trial court to resentence Mr. Mor-
gan. When the trial judge refused, Judge Hanson re-
sentenced Mr. Morgan to the lesser offense of posses-
sion of a controlled substance and ordered his release. 
Appellant submits it was error for the resentencing 
judge to assume jurisdiction and resentence respondent 
while Mr. Morgan's appeal was still pending before 
the Utah Supreme Court. Such action amounts to a 
lower state court serving as an intermediate appellate 
court thereby depriving this court of its role to serve 
as reviewing tribunal of lower state court decisions as 
provided in Utah Code Ann. § 77-39-1 (1953). 
Although Judge Hanson did not characterize his 
action as the granting of habeas corpus relief, that was 
the nature of Mr. Morgan's petition, and the results ob-
tained by Mr. Morgan were virtually the same. Utah 
is replete with case law which precludes an individual 
whose appeal is still pending from petitioning a lower 
state court for habeas corpus relief thereby attempting 
to use habeas corpus as a substitute for appellate review. 
In Johnson v. Turner, 24 Utah 2d 439, 473 P.2d 901 
(1968), this court held: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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"I t makes veritable mockery of the rules 
of procedure to permit a person to ignore the 
time limitations for taking procedural steps 
and obtain an appellate review of a judgment 
at any time he takes a notion by a habeas corpus 
proceeding. The efficient and orderly admin-
istration of justice and respect for the finality 
of judgments regularly arrived at demand that 
the merry-go-round of litigation stop some-
where." Id. at 904. 
Similarly, in Sullivan v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 85, 
448 P.2d 907 (1968), this court held: 
"When an accused is convicted of a crime, 
our law requires that any claimed error or de-
fect be corrected by a regular appeal within the 
time allowed by law, and if this is not done the 
judgment becomes final. I t can then be sub-
jected to collateral attack by an extraordinary 
writ only when the interests of justice so de-
mand because of some extraordinary circum-
stance or exigency: e.g., lack of jurisdiction, 
mistaken identity, where the requirements of 
law have been so ignored or distorted that the 
accused has been deprived of 'due process of 
law' "Id. at 87.908. 
Thus, in habeas corpus matters this court has clearly 
held that it is improper for lower state courts to assume 
the role of reviewing court by granting habeas corpus 
relief where an appellate remedy before the Utah Su-
preme Court is or was available to the accused absent a 
showing of the extraordinary circumstances expressed 
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in Sullivan, supra. In the present case, Mr. Morgan 
could easily have obtained appellate review of the issue 
presented by Judge Hanson simply by filing an amend-
ed brief with the Utah Supreme Court since his appeal 
was still pending. Indeed, this was the only proper rem-
edy available to respondent since reviewing jurisdiction 
rested with the Utah Supreme Court. Despite this avail-
able remedy, Judge Hanson took jurisdiction of the 
matter, acted as the reviewing court and resentenced 
and released the respondent. Although Judge Hanson 
chose to characterize his action as being something other 
than the granting of habeas corpus relief, the fact re-
mains that he acted as the reviewing tribunal thereby 
depriving this Court of that function. Thus, the policy 
expressed in Johnson v. Turner, supra, and Sullivan v. 
Turner, supra, is equally applicable to the present situa-
tion. 
Furthermore, appellant submits that the Utah Su-
preme Court obtained exclusive jurisdiction of the case 
or controversy pursuant to the filing and perfecting of 
the appeal, and until a decision on appeal was rendered, 
the appellate court maintained such exclusive jurisdic-
tion to hear all orders, injunctions, amendments to ap-
peal, or extraordinary writs. See 4 A C.J.S. Appeal and 
Error, § 606-607, wherein this position was adopted. 
See also Rodriquez v. Williston, 104 Ariz. 280, 451 P.2d 
609 (1969), wherein there was a showing that absent 
such a jurisdiction rule, it would be possible for the 
anomalous occurrence of a trial court granting a new 
trial on the same day the appellate court affirms the 
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judgment. Thus, the better rule of law is that the filing 
and perfecting of Mr. Morgan's appeal transferred all 
jurisdiction to the Utah Supreme Court during the 
pendency of such appeal and any motion, amendment 
or petition should have been addressed to that body by 
respondent. 
Finally, even if the resentencing judge's charac-
terization of his action as a resentencing is deemed ap-
propriate, appellant submits that the judge lacked juris-
diction to order a fellow district court judge (who had 
served as trial judge) to resentence respondent. Appel-
lant further submits that the trial judge's refusal to re-
sentence respondent was proper and that Judge Han-
son lacked jurisdiction to resentence respondent after 
Judge Sawaya's refusal. District court judges have 
have equal authority to serve as triers of fact at trial and 
are not bound by the opinions of fellow district court 
judges while acting in that capacity. The mere fact 
that another district court judge disagrees with the de-
cision of the trial judge does not authorize him to usurp 
the trial judge's authority by rehearing the matter and 
ordering the trial judge to resentence the accused. Judge 
Sawaya would be required to resentence respondent 
only if a superior state court (the Utah Supreme Court) 
first determined that the initial decision was improper 
and ordered the trial court to reassume jurisdiction and 
resentence the accused. See State v. Lee Lim, 79 Utah 
68, 7 P.2d 825 (1932) and Folck v. Watson, 102 Utah 
470, 132 P.2d 130 (1942). Judge Sawaya properly re-
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frained from resentencing respondent since an appeal of 
the conviction was still pending before this Court and no 
determination had yet been rendered by this Court as to 
the validity of Judge Sawaya's decision. 
In summary, appellant submits it is the Utah Su-
preme Court which has the jurisdiction to order the trial 
court to resentence an accused, and it is the trial court 
which has the jurisdiction to perform the resentencing. 
Judge Hanson lacked jurisdiction to do either. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully submits that this Court has 
previously ruled that there was sufficient evidence to 
support respondents' conviction and said conviction was 
proper. To sustain the lower resentencing court's ruling 
would establish an appellate procedure not forseen or 
authorized by the Utah Constitution or the Rules of 
Criminal Procedure governing the judiciary in the 
State of Utah. Based upon the case law and Utah stat-
utes cited, the appellant submits that Joseph Morgan's 
resentencing should be set aside and the original sen-
tence reinstated. 
Respectfully submitted, 
V E R N O N B. R O M N E Y 
Attorney General 
E A R L F . D O R I U S 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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